Introduction
Defamation law in Australia has long grappled with the challenge of reputational harm spreading beyond the initial publication.
This phenomenon, known as the “grapevine effect”, refers to the way defamatory imputations can be repeated informally, reaching audiences far removed from the original publication.
Recent legal developments — including the introduction of a statutory serious harm threshold in most jurisdictions — have prompted courts to refine how they assess the grapevine effect in proving harm and awarding damages.
This article examines the grapevine effect’s legal significance, the accuracy of recent case law interpretations, and key jurisdictional differences as of May 2025, focusing on how the concept has evolved since its High Court articulation in Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons [2001] HCA 69, the impact of the serious harm requirement (absent in Western Australia), and the courts’ approach to evidence of digital dissemination on social media.
The Grapevine Effect: Concept and Significance
The grapevine effect captures the reality that, once a defamatory statement is released, its “real damage” cannot be precisely measured because the slander or libel may be relayed to others through rumour or gossip. Lord Atkin described this in Ley v Hamilton (1935): "It is impossible to track the scandal, to know what quarters the poison may reach: it is impossible to weigh the compensation which will recompense a person for the pain of a false accusation." In defamation law, this insight justifies robust general damages. Even if a plaintiff cannot identify every person who encountered the slur, the law presumes some wider reputational harm as a natural consequence of the publication. This presumption historically allowed plaintiffs to recover general damages without strict proof of actual loss, on the premise that defamatory “poison” likely spread beyond the initial audience.
The grapevine effect also relates to the vindicatory function of defamation damages. Because it is often impossible for a plaintiff to know who later heard the slur, damages not only compensate for proven harm and personal distress, but also provide solace for unquantifiable future harm and serve to vindicate the plaintiff’s reputation. Courts have emphasised that an award of damages should be sufficient to convince a reasonable observer — even one who learns of the defamatory claim later “through the grapevine” — that the allegation was baseless.
High Court Endorsement in Palmer Bruyn & Parker v Parsons (2001)
The High Court of Australia in Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons [2001] HCA 69 acknowledged the grapevine effect when discussing how damages are assessed in reputation-based torts. Although the case concerned injurious falsehood, the Court’s reasoning drew on defamation principles. Gummow J noted that the “grapevine effect” is a metaphor explaining the breadth of general damages in defamation because one cannot track how far the defamation spreads or what damage ensues. Referencing Ley v Hamilton, his Honour affirmed that general damages are “at large”, covering not only observable harm but also the immeasurable likelihood of further dissemination.
The Serious Harm Threshold and the End of Presumed Damage
In 2021, Australian defamation law entered a new era with the enactment of the Stage 1 Model Defamation Amendment Provisions 2020 in most jurisdictions. A centrepiece of these reforms was the introduction of a “serious harm” element (now s 10A of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) and equivalent provisions elsewhere). A plaintiff must now prove that a publication "has caused, or is likely to cause, serious harm" to their reputation. This reform abolishes the old common‑law presumption of damage. Courts look to the United Kingdom’s Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2019] UKSC 27 when interpreting the serious harm requirement and insist on concrete evidence of impact.
Grapevine Effect in the Era of Serious Harm: Recent Case Law
Limited Spread: Rader v Haines [2022] NSWCA 198
In Rader v Haines, defamatory allegations were emailed only to the plaintiff’s parents. Having regard to English case law, the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that the serious‑harm threshold was not met. There was no evidence of wider dissemination or any grapevine effect; the limited publication failed to cause serious reputational damage.
Ongoing Social Media Campaign: Martin v Najem [2022] NSWDC 479
By contrast, Martin v Najem concerned a series of defamatory Instagram posts published by a well‑known food blogger. The District Court found that the serious‑harm element was satisfied because the posts were public, widely shared, and repeated. The Court inferred a grapevine effect from the online reach and awarded substantial damages, including aggravated damages and injunctive relief.
Procedural Clarity: Newman v Whittington [2022] NSWSC 249
Newman v Whittington provides guidance on pleading serious harm. The plaintiff’s initial pleading was struck out for failing to articulate specific facts showing serious reputational impact. The decision underscores that plaintiffs must plead particulars such as audience size, republication, or community reaction to rely on the grapevine effect.
Queensland Example: Hockings v Lynch & Adams [2022] QDC 127
Hockings v Lynch & Adams demonstrates a fact‑specific approach to social‑media publication. The Court examined Facebook analytics and evidence of cross‑sharing between groups to determine the extent of the publication. Damages reflected the proven scope of dissemination, distinguishing between posts that went viral and those limited to a narrow audience.
Digital Dissemination: Evidence of Online Reach vs. Potential Reach
Modern defamation claims often involve social media and require proof of actual dissemination. Courts accept analytics data (views, shares, likes), witness evidence of republication, and the nature of the platform in inferring or rejecting a grapevine effect. A mere theoretical potential for worldwide reach is insufficient without supporting evidence of traction.
Jurisdictional Divergence: Western Australia’s Non‑Adoption of Reforms
Western Australia (and the Northern Territory) has not enacted the Stage 1 reforms. Consequently, the serious‑harm threshold does not apply in those jurisdictions, and the common‑law presumption of damage persists. This divergence creates potential forum‑shopping incentives, as illustrated by Bartlett v Roffey [2023] WASC 3. Courts may transfer proceedings to prevent strategic venue choices, but plaintiffs can still benefit from the absence of a serious‑harm threshold in WA.
Conclusion
The grapevine effect remains central to Australian defamation law, explaining why damages are not confined to provable loss. Its role has shifted in jurisdictions with a serious‑harm threshold, where plaintiffs must produce evidence of dissemination to meet the statutory test. In Western Australia, the presumption of damage endures, underscoring significant jurisdictional differences. Practitioners must consider these nuances when advising clients and devising litigation strategies in defamation matters.
Sources
· Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons [2001] HCA 69 (208 CLR 388).
· Ley v Hamilton (1935) 153 LT 384 (KB).
· Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 10A; Defamation Act 2005 (WA) (unamended).
· Newman v Whittington [2022] NSWSC 249.
· Rader v Haines [2022] NSWCA 198.
· Martin v Najem [2022] NSWDC 479.
· Hockings v Lynch & Adams [2022] QDC 127.
· Bartlett v Roffey [2023] WASC 3.
· FJ v Siglin (No 2) [2024] WADC 13.
Grapevine Effect in Australian Defamation Law – Case Summaries
Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons [2001] HCA 69
In this High Court decision (which primarily concerned injurious falsehood), the “grapevine effect” was explicitly discussed as a concept in defamation law. Gummow J described the term “grapevine effect” as a metaphor used “to help explain the basis upon which general damages may be recovered in defamation actions”. His Honour quoted Lord Atkin’s famous statement in Ley v Hamilton that in defamation cases it is “impossible to track the scandal, to know what quarters the poison may reach”, emphasising that the real damage to reputation often cannot be precisely measured. In other words, defamatory remarks, once “driven underground,” may resurface and spread beyond the initial publication, which justifies awarding damages at large. This recognition underpins the law’s willingness to presume some level of damage to reputation even without direct evidence of harm in every quarter.
Importantly, Gummow J also cautioned that the grapevine effect is not a legal wild card but an inference drawn from the facts. He noted that the effect “may provide the means by which a Court may conclude that a given result was ‘natural and probable’. However, this will depend upon a variety of factors, such as the nature of the false statement and the circumstances in which it was published.” In short, a court can take likely republication into account when assessing defamation damages, but only if the evidence and context support a finding that further dissemination was the natural and probable consequence of the initial publication. The High Court’s remarks in Palmer Bruyn firmly entrenched the grapevine effect in Australian defamation jurisprudence as a real but fact-dependent phenomenon, rather than a presumption operating in a vacuum.
Newman v Whittington [2022] NSWSC 249
This was one of the first Australian cases to consider the newly introduced “serious harm” threshold in defamation, and Sackar J’s judgment provides a detailed treatment of the grapevine effect in the context of online defamation. His Honour reaffirmed the principle that defamatory communications often spread beyond their original audience, citing with approval the notion that “the dissemination of defamatory material is rarely confined to those to whom the matter is immediately published” and that the “poison” of a libel may extend beyond its initial recipients. The judgment references the High Court’s explanation in Palmer Bruyn and Lord Atkin’s metaphor, making clear that damages must account for the risk that a defamation, once public, can circulate broadly over time. Sackar J noted that defamation damages should contemplate republication because a slander “driven underground [may] emerge from its lurking place at some future date”, encapsulating the grapevine effect’s enduring impact.
In applying these principles, Newman v Whittington illustrates how the grapevine effect can bolster a plaintiff’s case on both serious harm and damages. The defendant’s allegations (posted on Facebook and a blog) were highly serious – accusing the plaintiff of supporting paedophiles and other misconduct – and were made on public platforms. The Court found strong evidence that the defamatory claims had circulated widely, or at least that they were likely to spread, given the public nature of the posts and the incendiary content. Sackar J explicitly allowed for the grapevine effect in the damages assessment, accepting that “by the ordinary function of human nature, the dissemination of defamatory material” would extend beyond the first audience. Even if the precise extent of publication could not be proven, the Court inferred continued circulation and lasting reputational harm. As a result, the plaintiff was found to have suffered (and be likely to suffer) serious harm to her reputation, and the Court awarded substantial general and aggravated damages, taking into account the probable spread of the defamation through the community. In sum, Newman v Whittington confirms that Australian courts will factor in the grapevine effect – supported by evidence or common sense inference – when determining if a defamatory publication has caused “serious harm” and in quantifying damages for reputational injury.
Rader v Haines [2022] NSWCA 198
The New South Wales Court of Appeal in Rader v Haines directly grappled with the grapevine effect in evaluating whether the serious harm threshold was met. This case involved an email containing defamatory accusations sent by a couple to the plaintiff’s parents – a very limited initial publication. The plaintiff argued that the email had nonetheless gravely harmed his reputation. However, the Court (Brereton JA, with Macfarlan JA agreeing) held that the evidence did not establish serious reputational harm, largely because the defamatory material had not spread beyond the original recipients. His Honour noted there was “no evidence presented that [the email] caused reputational harm to the appellant within a broader audience or via the ‘grapevine effect’.” In other words, there was nothing to show that anyone other than the two parent recipients had heard or believed the allegations. The parents’ negative reaction to the email was temporary, and they reconciled with the appellant within weeks, which meant the impact on the plaintiff’s reputation was fleeting and contained.
Rader v Haines makes clear that the grapevine effect is not to be presumed in a vacuum and that the onus is on the plaintiff to prove broader dissemination if it is to be relied upon. Brereton JA outlined factors relevant to “serious harm,” explicitly including whether there is any evidence of a grapevine effect (i.e. the allegations spreading beyond the immediate recipients). In this case, the absence of such evidence was decisive. The Court refused to infer serious harm merely from the gravity of the allegations or the plaintiff’s own feelings; without proof that the defamatory email had percolated through the community or reached others who thought less of the plaintiff, the statutory threshold was not satisfied. Thus, Rader v Haines serves as a cautionary counterpoint – it underscores that while courts recognize the grapevine effect, a plaintiff cannot rely on it unless there is tangible or inferential evidence of republication or rumour. The grapevine effect must be proven or at least plausibly inferred from the circumstances, and if a defamation remains limited to a tiny audience (as here, one’s parents), broad damage to reputation will not be found.
Martin v Najem [2022] NSWDC 479
In Martin v Najem, the District Court (Gibson DCJ) applied the grapevine effect doctrine in a modern social media context. The plaintiff, a prominent food blogger, sued a rival influencer who had published videos on Instagram calling him, among other things, “a paedophile” and “a racist.” Given the plaintiff’s public profile and the nature of the platform, the Court was satisfied that the serious harm element (required under the amended Defamation Act) was met – indeed, this case was noted as the first time an Australian court upheld a plaintiff’s claim under the new serious harm test. A key reason was the extensive dissemination and impact of the defamatory videos. Gibson DCJ found that the extreme gravity of the imputations, the mode and reach of publication, and the ensuing effects on the plaintiff all pointed to significant reputational harm.
Notably, the Court took into account the grapevine effect in reaching that conclusion. Because the defamatory statements were made by a well-known blogger on a public social media account, it was inferred that the allegations would naturally spread beyond the immediate viewers. In fact, there was evidence of substantial publication – for example, the Instagram account had a large follower count and the posts generated considerable attention. Gibson DCJ cited Sackar J’s discussion in Newman v Whittington (paras [30]–[46]) on the typical spread of defamation via the grapevine, underscoring that social media accelerates and amplifies the phenomenon. She observed that the “grapevine effect” was of particular significance in the circumstances of this online feud. In practical terms, this meant the Court was willing to infer that many people in the foodie and social media community would hear of the accusations (even if they did not witness the original posts), compounding the harm to the plaintiff’s reputation. Ultimately, Martin v Najem resulted in a substantial damages award ($300,000 including aggravated damages). The case highlights that when defamatory content is shared on social networks, courts will readily acknowledge the grapevine effect – supported by evidence like follower numbers, reactions, and the plaintiff’s public standing – to find serious harm and to ensure the damages adequately compensate for the likely spread of the false allegations.
Hockings v Lynch & Adams [2022] QDC 127
This Queensland District Court case illustrates a nuanced application of the grapevine effect in the context of Facebook publications. The plaintiff, Ms Hockings, sued the defendants over a series of defamatory posts on social media (Facebook) that had targeted her. In assessing the extent of publication and the appropriate damages, the Court (Porter QC DCJ) was mindful of the grapevine effect and the need to gauge how far the defamatory statements had permeated beyond the original posts. The judgment explicitly noted that the expression “grapevine effect” has long been used to explain how general damages in defamation compensate for unobservable spread of a slur. Echoing the High Court and other authorities, the Court acknowledged that the real harm of defamation often lies in its covert and uncontrolled propagation: the “real damage cannot be ascertained and established” because once a defamatory statement is published, one cannot easily “determine the extent to which the poison may reach.” Accordingly, Hockings v Lynch & Adams reinforced that courts must ensure a damages award is sufficient to vindicate the plaintiff if and when the defamation later “emerges from its lurking place” via the grapevine. As the Court observed, damages should be enough to convince a hypothetical bystander who learns of the slur down the track of its baselessness. This is effectively the vindicatory aspect of defamation damages, tightly linked to the grapevine effect principle.
Crucially, the court did not assume the grapevine effect operated uniformly for every publication – it examined the evidence for each post. In some instances, the plaintiff was able to show that the defamatory posts circulated beyond the originally intended audience, given the size of certain Facebook groups and the overlap of membership between groups. For those occasions, the judge found that publication was broader than the defendants admitted, meaning the grapevine had indeed carried the defamation to additional people. However, in other instances, the posts were seen only by the defendants’ own friends or followers and did not escape into the wider community. In those scenarios, the grapevine effect was minimal or nil. This balanced approach demonstrates that the grapevine effect is a fact-specific inquiry: the Court will infer or allow for reputational spread only to the extent justified by the social networks and circumstances at play. Ultimately, Hockings v Lynch & Adams awarded damages calibrated to the proven reach of the posts – accounting for broader dissemination where evidenced (or reasonably probable) and not speculating beyond that. The case stands as an example of a court carefully dissecting how a defamatory message on Facebook can ripple through shared connections (or, sometimes, remain relatively contained), and tailoring its legal response to those findings.
Dabrowski v Greeuw [2014] WADC 175
Dabrowski v Greeuw is an early Australian example of Facebook defamation and shows the court’s consideration of the grapevine effect in a relatively small-scale publication. The defendant, Ms Greeuw, had posted on her public Facebook page that she had separated from the plaintiff after “18 years of suffering domestic violence and abuse” – a serious allegation of misconduct by the plaintiff (Mr. Dabrowski). The District Court of Western Australia (Bowden DCJ) found this post defamatory and rejected the defence of truth, ultimately awarding the plaintiff $12,500 in general damages. In reaching that modest sum, the Court carefully evaluated the scope of publication and potential republication of the defamatory claim.
Bowden DCJ expressly noted the grapevine effect, observing that a statement on social media can be spread or repeated beyond the initial viewers. He cited the New South Wales case Mickle v Farley (which involved defamatory Facebook and Twitter posts) for the proposition that the “grapevine effect” stemming from the use of Facebook must be considered when assessing damages. The judge acknowledged that the defamatory imputations could have been circulated further by friends-of-friends or gossip – in theory, the grapevine effect “could mean that the defamatory imputations were repeated.” However, the critical finding in this case was that the actual reach of the post was quite limited. The evidence showed only a handful of people had seen the Facebook post (the plaintiff’s brother and a few others, including one person who stumbled upon it while looking up the plaintiff’s profile). There was no proof of any broad republication or that the wider community had learned of the allegations. In fact, the people who saw the post were mostly those in the plaintiff’s and defendant’s circle (and one curious outsider), and there was no indication of the news spreading further through the “grapevine.” Bowden DCJ noted that no special or financial loss was proved and that the remarks were made to a limited audience.
In these circumstances, while the Court conceptually recognized the grapevine effect, it did not significantly inflate the damages on the basis of any hypothetical spread. The judge treated the grapevine effect as a factor that was “properly taken into account in assessing damages”, but ultimately he assessed the harm as relatively contained. The result was a moderate damages award reflecting the injury to the plaintiff’s reputation among those who actually saw the post, without any premium for widespread dissemination (since none was shown). Dabrowski v Greeuw thus underscores that a plaintiff should present evidence of extended publication if they wish to leverage the grapevine effect; absent that, courts will limit damages to the scale of publication that is proven, even on social media.
Wilson v Ferguson [2015] WASC 15
Although Wilson v Ferguson was not a defamation case (it was a breach of confidence case concerning the unlawful sharing of private images on Facebook), the Supreme Court of Western Australia’s discussion is instructive on the grapevine effect’s broader relevance. The plaintiff’s ex-boyfriend had posted intimate photographs of her online out of revenge, and the Court (Mitchell J) was asked to award an injunction and equitable compensation for the distress and harm caused. The plaintiff’s counsel drew an analogy to defamation, arguing that the grapevine effect concept should guide the Court in appreciating how far and fast the humiliation could spread in a workplace and social community.
Mitchell J referred to defamation authorities on the grapevine effect but ultimately to make a cautionary point about evidence. He noted that in defamation cases, courts may take into account the potential republication of a defamatory statement when assessing general damages. Indeed, counsel cited Palmer Bruyn & Parker v Parsons [2001] HCA 69 at [88]–[89] in this regard. However, His Honour clarified that those cases dealt with how a court assesses damages given likely dissemination, and did not override the normal rules of proof. In the context of Wilson v Ferguson, this meant that while the Court was aware that gossip about the leaked photos could circulate (the modern “grapevine”), one still needed proper evidence to prove that such conversations and further publications had in fact occurred. The plaintiff sought to admit hearsay evidence that people at her workplace were talking about the images. Mitchell J refused to allow hearsay under the guise of the grapevine effect, holding that defamation law’s recognition of likely circulation does not make otherwise inadmissible evidence acceptable.
In the end, the Court did infer from admissible evidence that the defendant’s Facebook post was widely discussed among colleagues (the mine-site “Cloudbreak” employees). That inference was based on direct testimony, not just speculation. Mitchell J’s judgment therefore resonates with a key lesson: the grapevine effect can be a double-edged sword. It reminds courts of the real possibility of widespread harm, but it is not a license to dispense with proof. Even outside defamation, the notion that scandal spreads informed the Court’s approach to crafting relief – the judge granted an injunction and awarded ~$48,000 in equitable compensation, effectively acknowledging that the reputational and emotional harm was magnified by the broad dissemination of the private images. However, he grounded his findings in solid evidence of circulation rather than mere assumption. Wilson v Ferguson thus demonstrates the judiciary’s general acceptance of the grapevine effect’s logic (information online tends to diffuse quickly, causing extensive harm), coupled with a insistence on evidence-based reasoning when applying that logic to the facts at hand.
Each of these cases, in its own way, sheds light on how Australian courts handle the grapevine effect. From High Court endorsement of the concept in principle (Palmer Bruyn), to meticulous trial court applications in social media contexts (Newman, Martin, Hockings, Dabrowski), to a cautious evidentiary approach when the concept is invoked (Rader, Wilson), the consistent theme is that while the law recognizes people gossip and defamation can spread like wildfire, the extent of such spread must be proven or reasonably inferred from the circumstances. Courts will neither ignore the grapevine effect when justice requires it, nor will they assume it in the absence of any indicia. This calibrated approach ensures that damages and outcomes in defamation (and analogous actions) remain firmly anchored in the reality of each case.
